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ACADEMIC UNIONS IN RECESSIONARY TIMES
JOHN M. ROTHGEB, JR.
AND
KATHERINE MITAKIDES

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
MIAMI UNIVERSITY
OXFORD, OHIO

ABSTRACT
THIS ARTICLE INVESTIGATES HOW UNIONIZATION AFFECTED THE WAY COLLEGES AND
UNIVERSITIES HANDLED ISSUES RELATING TO FACULTY PAY AND LAYOFFS, DEGREE PROGRAM
CANCELLATIONS AND TEACHING LOADS, AND STUDENT SERVICES DURING THE SEVERE
RECESSION THAT HIT THE COUNTRY BETWEEN LATE 2007 AND EARLY 2010. THE DATA ARE
FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY OF DEPARTMENT CHAIRS. THE RESULTS REVEAL THAT
UNIONIZATION REDUCED THE LIKELIHOOD OF FACULTY PAY ACTIONS AND THAT CLASSES
WOULD BE TAUGHT AT EXTENDED TIMES, BUT WAS ASSOCIATED WITH A GREATER CHANCE
THAT CLASSES WOULD BE OFFERED AT OFF-CAMPUS LOCATIONS. UNIONIZATION HAD NO
EFFECT ON BUDGET CUTS, WHETHER FACULTY WERE LAID-OFF OR HAD THEIR TEACHING
LOADS INCREASED, AND WHETHER NEW PROGRAMS WERE SET UP TO MEET STATE AND/OR
COMMUNITY NEEDS.
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One of the most controversial issues in higher education relates to how faculty unions affect the
operation of U.S colleges and universities. As the American Association of University Professors (AAUP,
2011, p. 17) and the Chronicle of Higher Education (Schmidt, 2011, p. 2) report, governors and legislators
in several states recently acted to limit or ban collective bargaining by state employees (including those
working in higher education) in the belief that it creates excessive compensation and prevents institutions
from streamlining their operations by cutting budgets and eliminating outdated programs and unneeded
employees.i Examples of such anti-union behavior include a 2011 Wisconsin law that required yearly
recertification of public sector unions and limited the issues over which they could collectively bargain;
Ohio Senate Bill 5 (SB5), which attempted to circumscribe unions at public universities by classifying
faculty as managers; and a proposed Florida regulation that would severely restrict the rights of public
employees to form unions.ii
While controversies over collective bargaining have been part of academia since faculty unions formed
a half-century ago, recent conflicts occurred within the context of the financial problems stemming from
the severe national recession between late 2007 and early 2010, as higher education expenditures
nationwide dropped by $4 billion from 2008 to 2009 and by 15 percent overall between 2008 and 2012
(Clark, 2009; Nicas and McWhirter, 2012).iii As Douglass (2010, p. 8) notes, in 2009 and 2010 there were
major spending cuts on higher education in 34 states, while AAUP surveys from 2009 to 2011 also show
that the downturn also created steep decreases in the values of endowments and reductions in donations,
which affected campuses nationwide (AAUP, 2009; 2010; 2011).iv
These revenue-related problems resulted in campus budget cuts across the country and pressured
institutions to revise student-education methods, to create new programs to meet community needs, and to
deliver instruction at times, locations, and by methods more convenient for students (DeVise, 2009;
Carnevale, 2010, p. viii; Douglass, 2010, pp. 9-10).v Overall, these trends demanded that institutions shift
their focus, eliminate outdated departments and nonproductive faculty, and cut administrative overhead
(AAUP, 2009, p. 18; Selingo, 2012, p. A19), which magnifies the political demand to limit the role of
unions in higher education (Chubb and Moe, 1990; Ponak, et. al., 1992; Deckop, et. al., 1993; Porter and
Stephens, 2010).
Despite these controversies over how unions function in academia, Wickens (2008) and Schmidt (2011)
report that there has been little research on how unions affect the way colleges and universities handle these
types of financial problems. Instead, the research to date has focused on such issues as: why unions form
and what issues are addressed with collective bargaining; how unions affect faculty salaries, benefits, and
productivity; and how collective bargaining affects campus decision-making. Regarding union formation,
for example, Cameron (1985) and Wickens (2008) maintain that unions are most likely to appear when
faculty members have weak ties to their disciplines and there are administration/faculty conflicts; Goldey,
et. al. (2010) indicate that the probability of union formation is enhanced when faculty members harbor
pro-union sentiments and regard unions as useful for fighting injustice; Benedict (2012) states that
unionization is more likely when pro-union faculty leaders establish personal ties to other faculty members
and that administrators are somewhat passive; and Rassuli, et. al. (1999) note that, when forming unions
faculty members tend to focus almost exclusively on salary and job security issues.
Regarding research on salaries, benefits, and faculty productivity, while Barbezat (1989) found that
collective bargaining led to higher salaries for tenured faculty members and Benedict (2007) reports that
the ability of unions to raise salaries appears to grow over time, a reanalysis of the issue by Hedrick, et. al.
(2011) with different data and control variables suggests that unions may do little to increase faculty pay.
As for the issue of salary inequalities, there is widespread agreement that unions reduce department-todepartment variations in pay (Barbezat, 1989); some, but not all, of the salary inequities between men and
women (Kesselring, 1991; Ashraf, 1997; Benedict, 1999); and compensation differences between
minorities and other faculty members (Ashraf, 1997). Additionally, the analysis of how unions are related
to faculty productivity reveals that unions may be associated with less faculty research activity (Meador
and Walters, 1994), but do not affect faculty members’ willingness to engage in service activities or to work
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with students and teach (Deckop, et. al., 1993; Wickens, 2008) and do not protect incompetent faculty
(Rothgeb, 2014).
Finally, investigations of how unions affect academic decision-making reveal that unionization increases
the probability that faculty members receive tenure; that senior faculty obtain promotions; reduces some
male/female differences in tenure and promotions (Benedict and Wilder, 1999); and also may enhance
faculty influence over chair appointments and teaching loads (Porter and Stephens, 2010). Ponak et. al.
(1992) and Wickens (2008) note, however, that unions typically do not intrude into matters normally
handled by college/university senates and/or department chairs, such as governance issues, graduation
requirements, hiring decisions, and teaching and committee assignments.
While this research has been extremely valuable for providing insights into the role of unions in higher
education, an important gap remains regarding the part unions played in resolving some of the issues that
recently emerged. Research seeks to address these issues by investigating how unionization affected the
way colleges and universities handled problems relating to faculty pay and to lay-offs; to the elimination
of degree programs; to faculty teaching responsibilities; and to meeting their students’ educational needs in
the 2008-2010 time period. Exploring these issues should provide useful additional insights into how
unions operate in an academic setting and into the validity of the recent anti-union sentiments expressed by
many political leaders.

RESEARCH DESIGN
The data used in this analysis are from the authors’ survey of department chairs at 1,248 U.S. colleges
and universities.vi The questionnaire was mailed to the chairs in February 2010 and requested information
about the period from January 2008 to January 2010.vii The American Political Science Association
(APSA) provided the list of addresses.viii Only one questionnaire went to the political science department
at each college/university. Faulty addresses led to 36 returns for an effective population of 1,212.
Responses were received from 361 chairs (58 doctoral departments, 77 offering a master’s degree, and 226
with a bachelor’s program), yielding a response rate of 30 percent. Since the survey was anonymous, there
were no follow-up mailings.ix The survey instrument is in Appendix A.
The survey asked the chairs whether their institution had unionized (coded 1) or nonunionized (coded
0) faculty. This unionization measure follows the operationalization procedure utilized by Meador and
Walters (1994) and Porter and Stephens (2010). Approximately 18 percent of the responding chairs
reported that their college/university was unionized. Among chairs at public institutions, 36 percent
indicated they were unionized, a figure similar to the 35 percent unionization rate Metchick and Singh
(2004, p. 47) report and the 38 percent rate Wickens (2008, p. 546) discusses for public
colleges/universities.x Hence, the data from the current survey appear representative of unionization in
higher education nationwide.
The chairs also were asked for information about control variables. These questions included whether
their institution was publicly supported (coded 1) or private (coded 0); was rural (coded 1) or urban or
suburban (coded 0); treated teaching as the most important factor in a tenure case (yes = 1, no = 0); and
whether it enrolled fewer than 5,000 students (coded 1), 5,001 to 10,00 students (coded 2), 10,001 to 20,000
students (coded 3), or 20,001 or more students (coded 4).xi These variables were incorporated into the
analysis because in their discussions of collective bargaining in higher education Cameron (1985), Ashraf
(1997), Metchick and Singh (2004), Hedrick, et. al. (2011), and Benedict and Benedict (2012) suggest such
controls.xii
Additionally, the questionnaire asked about three categories of dichotomous dependent variables.
Dichotomous measures were used because of the nature of the political arguments (see above) that depict
unionization as preventing colleges/universities from taking certain types of action. That is, unionized
campuses are described as unable to engage in the behavior needed to cope with the circumstances they
confront, while those that are not unionized typically are described as better able to do so.xiii
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The first group of dependent variables dealt with faculty employment, and included whether the
institution in question experienced during the previous two years: moderate to severe layoffs of faculty
members (coded yes = 1, no = 0)xv, and faculty pay actions -- that is, pay cuts or pay freezes (yes = 1, no =
0).xvi A second group of variables pertained to the institution’s programs and teaching loads and comprised
whether in the prior two years degree programs were cancelled and/or suspended (yes = 1, no = 0)xvii and
(2) faculty members were required to take on a higher workload by teaching more classes (yes = 1, no = 0).
The third group of dependent variables related to whether the chair’s college/university during the previous
two years sought to better serve students by offering classes earlier in the morning, later at night, and/or on
weekends (yes = 1, no = 0);xviii (2) teaching more classes at off-campus locations (yes = 1, no = 0); and (3)
creating new degree programs to meet state and/or community needs (yes = 1, no = 0).
The chairs also were asked for information regarding budget cuts at their institution. Budget cuts were
examined because budgetary issues represent one of the more fundamental problems higher education
institutions faced between 2008 and 2010 and, as will be discussed below, such cuts are a key to a potential
indirect mechanism by which unionization may affect the dependent variables. Specifically, the
questionnaire asked if during the previous two years the responding institution experienced moderate to
severe budget cuts (coded yes = 1, no = 0).
Previous research suggests that among the dependent variables, unionization would have its greatest
effect on salary cuts and freezes since the contracts emerging from collective bargaining almost uniformly
set pay scales and limit administrative discretion about adjustments (see Barbezat, 1989, p. 453; Kesselring,
1991, p. 70; Ponak, et. al., 1992, p. 418; Meador and Walters, 1994, p. 383; Ashraf, 1997, p. 445; Porter
and Stephens, 2010, p. 16). Ponak, et. al. (1992, p. 418) point out that most contracts also have clauses
pertaining to layoffs, but note that such provisions primarily specify the procedures that must be followed
when taking such actions and are not meant to foreclose them. Hence, unionization may not affect faculty
layoffs. As far as program closings, faculty workloads, extended teaching times, off-campus locations, and
new programs are concerned, the research to date points in two possible directions:
Ponak, et. al. (1992, pp. 418-22) Rassuli, et. al. (1999, p. 215), and Porter and Stephens (2010, pp. 1516) note that faculty generally do not expect collective bargaining to address such issues and that most
union agreements do not do so, and Deckop et. al. (1993, p. 94) report that unions do not affect faculty
commitments to their teaching and service duties, indicating that there would be no association between
unionization and these variables.
Cameron (1985, pp. 389, 400), however, found that unions tend to form when faculty and administrators
experience conflict, and a more recent study by Goldey et. al. (2010, p. 343) indicates that faculty are more
inclined to favor unionization when they distrust administrators. Wickens (2008, p. 555) also reports that
substantial previous research suggests that unions tend to emerge when faculty/administrator relations are
strained.
When one considers the wrenching dislocations associated with the cancellation of programs, layoffs,
increased teaching loads, and teaching at extended times and at off-campus locations, one might surmise
that a cooperative faculty/administrator atmosphere is essential and that the presence of unions could signal
that such a climate does not exist. If this is the case, then unionization may be negatively related to these
dependent variables.
In addition to these direct effects of unionization, it’s important to consider the potential indirect impact
from budget cuts by examining a two-step process. The first relates to the possibility that unionization
renders budget cuts less likely, either due to the complex contracts produced by collective bargaining or
because of administrator fears cuts would lead to union protests that might harm the institution (Deckop,
et. al. 1993, p. 85; Porter and Stephens, 2010, p. 4). Second, if budget cuts are a major reason for change,
then if a unionized campus faces a lower probability of such cuts, it would be less likely to make changes.
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The analysis of the direct and indirect effects of unionization involved the use of logit regression, a
technique that assesses how an independent variable affects a dichotomous dependent variable while
controlling for the remaining variables in the analysis.xix Assessing the direct and indirect relationships
required the use of three basic equations. The first investigated the effect of unionization on the intervening
variable, budget cuts. The second examined the effect of unionization on each dependent variable. The
third analyzed unionization and budget cuts together for their impacts on the dependent variables. Nie, et.
al. (1975, pp. 386-87) and Asher (1976, pp. 11-20) discuss using regression for examining direct and
indirect relationships of the sort investigated here. The model used for the first equation was:
BudgetCut = a + b1Union + b2Public/Private + b3Rural + b4Teaching + b5Enrollment + e
The model used to examine cancelled programs provides an example of the second type of equation:
Cancel = a + b1Union + b2Public/Private + b3Rural + b4Teaching + b5Enrollment + e
And finally, an example of the third type of equation is:
Cancel = a + b1Union + b2Public/Private + b3Rural + b4Teaching + b5Enrollment + b6BurgetCut + e
Before turning to the findings, it should be noted that when reading Table 1 in the next section, the first
row lists the independent variables and the second row contains the logit results for the effect of each
variable on budget cuts. In Tables 2 and 3 the independent variables are listed across the top and the
dependent variables are on the left side with the results for each logit model running across the rows.

RESULTS
Table 1 has the results for the relationship between unionization and budget cuts. As can be seen, the
former has no effect on the latter.xx This casts doubt on the possibility that unionization indirectly affects
the dependent variables by way of its effect on budget cuts. Among the remaining variables, one finds that
the probability that public institutions would experience budget cuts was .13 greater than for private.
The results for the effects of unionization on the dependent variables without a control for budget cuts
are in Table 2. Here one finds that unions decreased both the probability that faculty would receive a pay
cut or freeze (by .21) and the chance that classes would be offered at extended hours and/or on weekends
(by .15), but increased the likelihood that classes would be taught at off-campus locations (by .11).
Table 2 also indicates that public institutions had a greater probability of pay cuts (.15 higher), of
program cancellations (a rise of .13), of higher teaching loads (a .12 increase), and of classes taught off
campus (.13 higher). In addition, each unit increase in an institution’s size produced a .06 greater
probability that it would offer classes at extended times, and teaching-oriented colleges/universities were
.10 more likely to create new degree programs to meet community needs.
The final set of results in Table 3 shows that budget cuts increase the probabilities of pay cuts or freezes
(by .27), faculty layoffs (by .28), program cancellations (by .17), higher teaching loads (by .08), and
teaching at extended hours (by .07). Budget cuts also reduced (by .07) the chance that new degree programs
would be set up to help the community; however, these effects were independent of any prior relationship
with unionization. In addition, one should note that controlling for budget cuts eliminated the impact of
the public/private variable on pay actions and program cancellations, suggesting that the effect of
public/private on these variables is indirect and results from the effect of public/private on budget cuts.
The implications of these results are discussed in the following section.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This research used a survey of department chairs to assess how academic unions affected some of the
problems colleges/universities faced between 2008 and 2010. While the current data and research design
did not allow for the examination of how recessions affect the way unions operate in higher education, it
was possible to gain some understanding of how unionization impacted such things as faculty employment
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issues, programmatic and teaching load decisions, how student and community needs could be addressed,
and budget cutting.xxi As discussed earlier, these are among the pressing issues many observers and
politicians argue unions prevent higher education institutions from dealing with.
The results revealed that, with the exception of the tendency for unionized facilities to experience fewer
pay cuts and freezes and less teaching at extended times, unionization had few effects on the way institutions
handled things. That is, the findings indicate that unionization did not hamper the ability to cut budgets, to
cancel or suspend academic programs, to lay off faculty, to increase faculty teaching loads, or to develop
new degree programs to meet community needs. Additionally, unionization was associated with a greater
tendency toward teaching classes at more convenient off-campus locations. These findings call into
question the oft-heard political assertions about union obstructionism.
Of course, it should be recognized that further research is needed. In particular, the examination of
efficiency and cost savings might focus on how higher educational institutions are handling new educational
technologies, how cost effective these technologies are, and on the role unions play when these technologies
are introduced to a campus. And the evaluation of student services might examine exactly what academic
programs colleges and universities have created in recent years, how they contribute to the students and/or
communities they serve, how well they perform as regards student graduation and employment rates, and
what role unions played in creating these programs. Beyond this, it would be useful to investigate whether
unionization affects the connections colleges and universities have with employers in the private and public
sectors and how students are affected.
In closing, this research provides a beginning toward answering questions central to the national debate
on higher education and to the role of unions. Much work remains, especially when one considers the
upward trend in the costs colleges and universities face and the low probability that governmental
institutions will substantially increase their contributions toward defraying the price of a college degree in
the near future (see Belkin, 2013a, pp. A1, A5; Belkin, 2013b, p. A3).xxii One thing this research suggests,
however, is that an excessive focus on limiting academic unions probably will make a minimal contribution
to solving higher education’s problems.
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TABLE 1: THE EFFECTS OF UNIONIZATION ON BUDGET CUTS

Union

Public

Rural

Size

Teaching

Constant

Cox and
2

.12

.76a

.02

.04

-.42

1.07c

(.42)

(.39)

(.32)

(.20)

(.31)

(.42)

[nc]

[.13]

[nc]

[nc]

[nc]

Nagelkerke

Snell R

R2

.04

.07

Note: N = 336, a is p < .10, b is p < .05, c is p < .01, and d is p < .001.
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors, and the figures in brackets indicate the change in the
probability of the dependent variable resulting from a change in the independent variable (nc = no
significant change).
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TABLE 2: THE EFFECTS OF UNIONIZATION WITHOUT A CONTROL FOR BUDGET CUTS

Union

Public

Rural

Size

Teaching

Constant

Cox and
Snell R2

Pay

-.92c

.68b

.11

-.05

.26

.46

.04

Nagelkerke
R2
.05

Actions

(.32)

(.33)

(.28)

(.16)

(.27)

(.34)

(N=336)

[-.21]

[.15]

[nc]

[nc]

[nc]

Lay-offs

-.22

.24

.41

.06

-.20

-1.47d

.01

.02

(N=334)

(.36)

(.36)

(.30)

(.17)

(.31)

(.39)

[nc]

[nc]

[nc]

[nc]

[nc]

Cancel

-.43

.79

b

.18

.17

.27

-2.29d

.03

.06

Program

(.39)

(.39)

(.32)

(.18)

(.33)

(.45)

(N=333)

[nc]

[.13]

[nc]

[nc]

[nc]

c

-.36

-.35

.35

-2.13d

.03

.05

(.52)

.04

.05

.03

.05

.02

.03

Teaching

.13

1.22

Load

(.44)

(.47)

(.40)

(.22)

(.39)

(N=336)

[nc]

[.12}

[nc]

[nc]

[nc]

Extend

-.65a

.24

-.19

.27a

-.06

-1.02c

Teach

(.33)

(.32)

(.27)

(.15)

(.27)

(.35)

(N=332)

[-.15]

[nc]

[nc]

[.06]

[nc]

Classes
Off
Campus

.55a

.68a

-.10

-.04

.28

-1.50d

(.32)

(.35)

(.29)

(.17)

(.29)

(.38)

[.11]

[.13]

[nc]

[nc]

[nc]

.24

.10

-.38

.15

.43a

-.15

(.31)

(.31)

(.26)

(.15)

(.26)

(.33)

[nc]

[nc]

[nc]

[nc]

[.10]

(N=333)
New
Program
(N=332)

Note: a is p < .10, b is p < .05, c is p < .01, and d is p < .001.
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors, and the figures in brackets indicate the change in the
probability of the dependent variable resulting from a change in the independent variable (nc = no
significant change).
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TABLE 3: THE EFFECTS OF UNIONIZATION WITH A CONTROL FOR BUDGET CUTS

Union

Public

Rural

Size

Teaching Budget

-1.07c

.26

.07

-.08

.30

1.19c

Constant Cox
and
Snell
R2
c
-1.68
.14

(.34)

(.36)

(.30)

(.17)

(.20)

(.20)

(.51)

[-.24]

[nc]

[nc]

[nc]

[nc]

[.27]

Lay-offs

-.27

-.47

.40

.04

-.32

1.56d

-4.48d

(N=334)

(.39)

(.42)

(.32)

(.18)

(.33)

(.26)

(.67)

[nc]

[nc]

[nc]

[nc]

[nc]

[.28]

Cancel

-.47

.29

.13

.19

.28

1.06d

-4.39d

Program

(.40)

(.43)

(.33)

(.19)

(.35)

(.25)

(.67)

(N=333)

[nc]

[nc]

[nc]

[nc]

[nc]

[.17]

.83a

-.24

-.28

.34

.75c

-3.70c
(.75)

Cuts
Pay
Actions
(N=336)

Teaching .10
Load

(.44)

(.49)

(.40)

(.23)

(.39)

(.28)

(N=336)

[nc]

[.08]

[nc]

[nc]

[nc]

[.08]

Extend

-.64a

.04

-.13

.30a

-.03

.31a

-1.67d

Teach

(.34)

(.33)

(.28)

(.16)

(.27)

(.18)

(.48)

(N=332)

[-.15]

[nc]

[nc]

[.07]

[nc]

[.07]

Classes

.57a

.61a

-.08

.00

.32

.02

-1.63d

Off

(.32)

(.35)

(.29)

(.17)

(.29)

(.19)

(.51)

Campus

[.11]

[.12]

[nc]

[nc]

[nc]

[nc]

New

.26

.18

-.39

.17

.44a

-.29a

.37

Program

(.32)

(.32)

(.26)

(.15)

(.26)

(.17)

(.45)

(N=332)

[nc]

[nc]

[nc]

[nc]

[.11]

[-.07]

Nagelkerke
R2
.19

.14

.22

.10

.15

.04

.09

.05

.07

.03

.05

.03

.04

(N=333)

Note: a is p < .10, b is p < .05, c is p < .01, and d is p < .001.
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors, and the figures in brackets indicate the change in the
probability of the dependent variable resulting from a change in the independent variable (nc = no
significant change).
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APPENDIX A: THE SURVEY INSTRUMENT
2010 ACADEMIC SURVEY: Please circle your answer and skip items you cannot answer.
The highest degree offered by my department is: Bachelors

Masters

Doctoral

The number of tenure track and tenured faculty in my department is: 1-10 11-20 21-30 over 30
My college/university is:

Public

Private

The location of my college/university is: Urban

Suburban

My college/university has a religious affiliation:
The faculty at my college/university is:

Yes

Unionized

Rural

No
Not Unionized

Total enrollment at my institution is: under 5000 5000-10,000 10,001-20,000 over 20,000
Over the past two years, at my institution:
Faculty experienced a pay freeze or pay cut:

Yes

No

Classes have been taught earlier in the morning, later at night, and/or on week-ends:

Yes

No

More classes have been taught at off-campus locations:

Yes

No

Degree programs have been canceled and/or suspended:

Yes

No

New degree programs have been created to meet state and/or community needs:

Yes

No

Budget cuts have been:

Few

Moderate

Severe

Lay-offs of faculty have been:

Few

Moderate

Severe

The teaching load of tenured and tenure track faculty has:

Increased

Been constant

Decreased
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(SURVEY CONTINUED)
At my college/university:
The most important factor in tenure decisions is the candidate’s research productivity:

Yes

No

The most important factor in tenure decisions is the candidate’s teaching record:

Yes

No
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ENDNOTES
1

The AAUP (2011, p. 17) depicts several governors and former governors as hostile to unions.
Included are Mitch Daniels (Indiana), Mitt Romney (Massachusetts), Rick Snyder (Michigan), Tim
Pawlenty (Minnesota), Christine Todd Whitman and Chris Christie (New Jersey), John Kasich
(Ohio), and Scott Walker (Wisconsin). For examples of discussions and research relating to public
employee compensation questions, see Keefe (2010) and Schmitt (2010). A description of the
politically contentious atmosphere regarding unions and higher education is provided by Benedict and
Benedict (2012).
2
SB5 was defeated in a statewide referendum in 2011.
3

Economists agree that the recession began in December 2007 and formally ended in June 2009.
The AAUP (2011, p. 4) reports that the impact on higher education continued throughout 2010. The
Pew Research Center (2010), Samuelson (2010), Trumbull (2010), and Warner (2010) also argue that
the recession’s effects were felt in 2010.
4

These cuts were on top of a twenty-year trend toward less state spending on higher education and
a nine percent reduction in public spending between 2001 and 2008 (Martin and Lehren, 2012;
Tandberg, 2010, p. 417).
5

The ongoing nature of these problems is illustrated by controversies over budgetary disputes and
pressures to serve students more efficiently that led to the dismissals and resignations since November
2011 of presidents at the Universities of Oregon, Wisconsin, and Illinois and at Louisiana State
University. Additionally, presidents at the Universities of Texas and Virginia clashed with governing
boards for the same reasons. See Lewin (2012) and Nicas and McWhirter (2012).
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6

The Miami University Institutional Review Board for Human Subjects Research approved this
project.
7

The survey was sent to political science department chairs because the authors are political
scientists and one of the authors has previous experience working with the APSA list to conduct
national higher education surveys. Since this analysis focuses on whether unions hampered colleges
and universities as they responded to the many challenges posed between 2008 and 2010, the
institutional level data acquired from department chairs was considered appropriate. It should be noted
that in their study of collective bargaining in higher education, Porter and Stephens (2010) acquired
their institutional data from a survey of college/university presidents and chairs of faculty Senates.
Such a procedure was not employed herein because a pilot survey of the chief administrators (usually
presidents or provosts) in the authors’ home state yielded a response rate of less than 5 percent.
8

Using a chair survey raises the question of whether chairs can provide an accurate picture of the
events that transpire at their college/university. Research shows they are well positioned to do so.
Hubbell and Homer (1997, p. 209) report that chairs are a key part of an institution’s “management
team,” Leslie (1973, p. 423) and Wildavsky (1992, p. 87) note that chairs must understand all parts of
their college/university in order to do their jobs, and Knight and Holen (1985, p. 677) assert that chairs
do up to 80 percent of the administrative work in academia. Hence, by virtue of their position chairs
must understand other departments and administrative offices and must be familiar with the issues
confronting their institution. Moreover, the authors’ previous research shows that chairs are an
excellent source for the information needed to conduct the current research (see Rothgeb, et. al., 2007;
Rothgeb and Burger, 2009; Marshal and Rothgeb, 2011; Rothgeb, 2014).
9

The APSA maintains a list of political science and related departments (i.e. History and Political
Science, Government, Political Science and Public Administration, etc.) in the United States. The
APSA seeks to ensure that all such departments are included. Many of those who research issues
pertaining to the profession of higher education employ the APSA list and/or lists from similar
professional organizations. Examples of such research include Euchner and Jewell (1989), Park and
Riggs (1993), Dolan, et. al. (1997), Schlozman (1998), Premeaux and Mondy (2002), Fuerstman and
Lavertu (2005), Rothgeb, et. al. (2007), Hartlaub and Lancaster (2008), Rothgeb and Burger (2009),
and Hesli, et. al. (2012). While the use of lists from professional associations is a standard procedure,
it is important to note that the findings obtained from such surveys may reflect a bias due to the omission
of some departments or institutions. Hence, the reader should use caution when examining the results.
10

Response rates for professional higher education surveys typically range between 18 percent
(Hartlaub and Lancaster, 2008) and 40 percent (Deckop, et. al., 1993). The 30 percent response rate
obtained herein falls near the middle of this range. It is important to note that the responses from
surveys of this sort are not random. Since the survey was conducted anonymously (as required by the
Miami University Institutional Review Board for Human Subjects research), it was not possible to
compare the characteristics of the respondents and non-respondents. Thus, while the results from this
survey provide a useful starting point for examining how unions affect the dependent variables
examined herein, additional analysis is required.
11

It should be noted that the proportion of unionized institutions nationwide varies over time as some
colleges/universities join and leave the ranks of the unionized.
Teaching as the most important factor in a tenure case was meant to assess the institution’s
commitment to teaching as its primary mission. To evaluate the effects of alternative control variables,
the analysis was conducted with controls for research as the most important factor in a tenure case and
for whether the responding institution had a religious affiliation. In neither case were the results
affected.
12
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13

The public/private variable also was included because, as Metchick and Singh (2004) and Benedict
and Benedict (2012) note, in National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) v. Yeshiva (1980) the United
States Supreme Court ruled that faculty at private institutions could not unionize if they played a
managerial role. This decision made the organization of unions at private colleges and universities
more difficult since it required faculty to demonstrate that they played no role as managers, but the
decision did not directly affect publicly funded institutions since they are subject to state unionization
laws. The public/private variable is meant to control for this difference.
14

Kay (1991, p. 9) and Pampel (2000, p. 1) point out that employing dichotomous data is a timehonored and useful approach to research that can yield valuable information about the relationships
between variables. Regarding the questionnaire design, Babbie (1973, p. 143) states that “the
respondent should be able to read an item quickly, understand its intent, and select or provide an answer
without difficulty.” Agnew and Pyke (2007, p. 217) agree, arguing that the key to constructing
successful questionnaires is to include items that can be answered without forcing the interviewee to
do research before answering it. The scales employed in the present survey were designed to follow
these recommendations. It also is important to note that the surveys went to professional political
scientists who were instructed to “skip any items you cannot answer” and omit “any part of [the] survey
[that] makes you uncomfortable or [that] you find inappropriate.” Given these considerations, it seems
safe to assume that if the survey items or the potential responses accompanying those items were
problematic, the chairs either would have refused to answer or would have commented on any problems
they detected. This did not happen.
The terms “moderate” and “severe” were employed to distinguish the substantial from the
negligible. That is, to capture a situation in which a relatively large proportion of faculty members are
affected as opposed to one in which very few or none are impacted. Regarding budget cuts (see below
in the text), the goal is to distinguish fairly large scale cuts from more normal circumstances (i.e. saving
money by cutting the consumption of paper by using e files).
15

16

Although pay cuts and pay freezes are different, both restrict faculty salaries and the AAUP treats
both as indicators that an institution is engaging in an act that undermines appropriate faculty
compensation (see AAUP, 2009, p. 18; 2010, p. 7; 2011, p. 5)
17

It should be noted that suspending and cancelling a degree program would have the same basic
short-term effect since in either case the program would not be available to students and the faculty in
the program would confront the need to rearrange their professional schedules. Indeed, the use of
“suspension” as opposed to “cancellation” primarily reflects institutional preferences about how it
refers to the act of downgrading a degree program.
This variable represents an institution’s attempt to make an education more convenient for students
by scheduling classes on weekends and/or at times of day that better fit students’ schedules. See Devise
(2009) for a discussion of how colleges have been forced to confront this issue.
18

19

For discussions of logit, see Pampel (2000) and Menard (2002).

20

Similar results were obtained when parallel analysis was conducted that controlled for whether the
construction of new facilities on campus and the number of new students at the institution were
increasing, decreasing, or constant.
21

As one of the anonymous reviewers noted, an assessment of how recessions affected the role of
unions in higher education would require surveys from recessionary and non-recessionary periods so
that a pooled cross-temporal data set could be created and a unions/recession interaction term could be
incorporated into the analysis.
22

The Delta Cost Project has estimated that higher education will confront financial challenges for
many years to come (Desroucher, et. al., 2010, p. 5).
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